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Abstract:
The paper is concerned with the investment response to temporary trade shocks when capital in
the commodity and import-competing sectors is irreversible once installed.  Previous literature
has argued in general terms that investment is likely to rise in response to sharp relative price
movements because the return to capital in one of the sectors will increase.  A rigorous model
of investment under uncertainty in the two-sector commodity price shocks context is developed
and used to investigate this issue.  It is shown that investment booms in response to commodity
price shocks are likely but not certain to occur and a boom at the end of the shock may also be
expected.  The predictions of the theory are shown to be consistent with the evidence from a
small sample of countries during the late 1970s coffee/cocoa boom.1
Introduction
This paper is concerned with the investment response to temporary commodity price shocks
when capital is sector specific and irreversible once installed.  It makes use of the insights of the
irreversibility and investment literature to develop a rigorous two sector model of the optimal
investment response to a temporary price shock.  The model is simulated across a range of
possible parameter values and the output compared with the actual investment responses of a
small sample of countries to the late 1970s coffee/cocoa boom.
That boom has stimulated a substantial literature on trade shocks
1 but formal work within it has
tended to focus on the consumption/saving (rather than investment) response to price shocks and
policy questions.  These issues are extremely important, both because a key policy question has
been whether the private sector savings response to a temporary shock would be appropriate (and
hence if so there would be no need for government to play a custodial role by taxing the windfall
from the boom), and also because the general policy responses have often been regarded as
severely sub-optimal.  Hence this literature has tended not to emphasise the investment response
to relative price changes which is the focus of the current paper.  This shift of emphasis is also
natural because relative price effects were often small or absent in the 1970s (as we show below)
because the great majority of developing countries stabilised domestic producer prices of
commodities.  With almost all price stabilisation schemes and marketing board arrangements
abolished from the late 1980s, relative price effects are likely to be much more important in the
future.
2  The trade theory literature
3 has also examined the effects of terms of trade changes on
a number of variables but  also  without examining the  combination of sector specific
irreversibility and uncertainty that is the focus of the current paper.
Hence the key contribution of the current paper is its modelling of investment dynamics in
response to relative price changes in the presence of uncertainty about the duration of the current
price and irreversibility of capital at the sectoral level.  The analysis is intended to improve our
understanding of when investment booms are likely to occur as commodity prices (or the terms
of trade) fluctuate.  Bevan, Collier and Gunning (1990) provide the key intuition in that a
sizeable increase in the relative commodity price, a "trade shock", will greatly increase the return
to capital in the commodity sector and thus stimulate investment.  If non-tradeable capital goods
are important in production that investment boom will translate into a non-tradeable capital
goods ("construction") boom also.  Equally a large fall in the commodity price will give rise to
the same effects in reverse with increased investment in the import-competing sector.  This paper
goes both much further and less far than that argument.  It goes further in that formal modelling
of the investment responses of both sectors allows for a much more precise prediction of when
investment booms will occur and their possible size.  An important point here is that when the
favoured sector expands in response to a price change the other sector will allow its capital stock
to depreciate.  If depreciation is at a plausible (low) rate the combined capital stock increases but
the change in aggregate investment is ambiguous: compared with before the price shock the
favoured sector is investing more but the other sector will no longer be undertaking replacement
investment.  The net effect of these changes depends on the size of the investment response in
the favoured sector (which in turn will depend on expectations about the duration of the boom
and the severity of the losses from irreversibility that would occur if or when the boom is
reversed), the relative size of the two sectors, and their capital intensities.  The paper does not,
however, include non-tradeable capital goods and hence its predictions concern investment2
booms rather than construction booms in particular, and while we draw general conclusions on
the latter these are not based on formal analysis.
It may be noted that analyses of this type assume that commodity price changes may be
characterised by relatively large infrequent swings so discrete shock episodes may be identified.
This is an entirely plausible procedure in relation to the coffee and cocoa price shocks of the late
1970s but in general it might be argued that other commodity prices may be better characterised
by ongoing volatility in which price changes are frequent and less readily divided into discrete
episodes.  It is clear that there is no distinct dividing line between these two descriptions of price
movements but the results developed below are based on the assumption of a discrete shock with
defined start and end dates.  Hence the model is less informative about investment dynamics in
response to higher frequency volatility except in so far as the typical price innovation has
persistent effects
4 whereupon its results will carry over to some extent.
While the investment responses outlined above are the main focus of the paper we also analyse
their implications for three related issues as follows.
First the relationship between investment and the terms of trade has been difficult to establish
in empirical work with different studies finding different signs to the relationship (see Serven,
1997 for a recent overview).  The paper shows why this may be so, in particular by showing that
investment is driven as much by changes in the terms of trade as in its level.
Second, we examine in a very stylised way possible feedback effects onto world commodity
prices from the supply response, partly driven by investment, to exogenous changes in those
prices.  The model clarifies how the supply response is likely to vary during a commodity price
boom and also shows that prices after a shock may be lower than their steady state values as a
result of the irreversibility of capital acquired during the boom: investment during the boom
raises the capital stock and this stock remains higher (and hence prices are lower) for some time
after the shock until depreciation allows a new steady state to be reached.  Hence irreversibility
implies that a temporary price shock may have long-lasting supply effects and this may help to
explain part of the serial correlation in commodity prices that has otherwise been difficult to
rationalise (see Deaton and Laroque, 1995, for a recent discussion).
Third  our formal  model assumes access  to  a  perfect  world  capital market  (a natural, if
unrealistic, benchmark case) but the investment dynamics that it predicts may readily be
compared with what would occur if investment had to be financed from internally generated
funds.  This area is complex and there are a number of different modelling approaches that may
be taken but we show that financing constraints, while still important, do not prevent sizeable
investment responses to relative price swings.  This reflects the fact that the "invest in good
times, allow  the capital  stock to depreciate in bad times" nature of optimal irreversible
investment decisions means that times when unconstrained investment would be positive tend
to correlate with times when internal funds are higher than usual.
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 1 outlines the model while Section 2 simulates it in
order to generate different scenarios and possible results for the investment dynamics in response
to commodity price shocks.  This constitutes the core of the analysis but we also compare the
results with the actual investment data for a small sample of countries during the late-1970s














terms of trade and investment may be difficult to pin down and suggests possible alternative
specifications.  Sections 3 and 4 look at the feedback effects on world prices and the role of
financing constraints discussed above.  Section 5 concludes.
1. The Model
5
It is assumed that there are two competitive sectors with physical output X and M of the
commodity and import-competing goods respectively.  These outputs are produced using Cobb
Douglas technology given by (1) which we assume for simplicity to be symmetric in the ￿ and
￿ parameters.  The notation is li for labour in sector i, Ki for the sectoral capital stock and Fi a
further fixed factor in each sector (discussed below).
The labour force in the economy is fixed but labour is assumed to be fully mobile between
sectors so the wage rate in each will equalise in each period.  Without loss of generality we
normalise the aggregate labour endowment to unity so lm=1-lx.
Capital goods are sector specific and all imported.  They are assumed to be available in elastic
supply from the world market at constant prices PKx and PKm (non-linear adjustment costs are not
considered) but irreversible once installed so the rates of depreciation, ￿x and ￿m, represent the
upper limit on the speed with which the sectoral capital stocks may shrink.  These assumptions
imply a major asymmetry between the upward and downward flexibility of the sectoral capital
stocks which strongly drives the dynamics of the investment responses to price changes.  Two
further assumptions are that the capital goods are used in production and neither stored nor
scrapped, and that there is a delivery or time to build lag between the decision to invest and the
new capital goods becoming productive.  In the simulations below we set this lag at one and four
years in turn, the former corresponding approximately to equipment-type goods and the latter
to tree crops where new trees take some time to mature before becoming productive.
We also assume that the economy has access to a perfect world capital market with (real) interest
rate, r
*.  This assumption, together with the absence of non-tradeable consumer goods, separates
production and consumption decisions in the economy and makes risk neutrality an appropriate
assumption such that investment decisions will depend solely on expected returns.  Hence the
structure of the model is focused tightly on the investment response to changes in the sectoral
returns to capital in the presence of uncertainty about the continuation of the price shock.  The
motivation for this is that these factors are missing from the current literature.
It is assumed that there is free entry to each sector which, in relation to irreversibility and
investment models, means that there is no option value of waiting since if the irreversibility
constraint is not binding expected present value net returns (carefully specified to include future
states in which it may bind and losses occur) will be driven to zero.  Irreversibility still matters,
however, since there is an entry asymmetry between good and bad states of the world for the
return to capital.  In a good state firms may enter without any barriers but in a bad state not only
will there be no new entry but existing firms cannot exit due to irreversibility.  This asymmetry
is incorporated in the equilibrium condition for the capital stock by means of taking into account


































The third factor of production in each sector, given by F x and Fm in (1), is assumed to be entirely
fixed, both by sector and over time.  Given the international mobility of capital this factor is
necessary to avoid complete specialisation and may be interpreted as being sector specific human
capital or natural resources in inelastic supply (at least over the timeframe of a few years
considered here).  For agricultural commodities this fixed factor may be interpreted as being
land.  For simplicity we choose units so F x=Fm to avoid their ratio cluttering the expressions
below.
The remaining notation comprises P x and Pm for the pre-shock world prices of X and M
respectively.  We make the M good the numeraire and hence P m=1 and all other prices are
relative to this price.  When the shock occurs the relative price of the commodity rises to
Px(1+s), where s is the proportionate size of the shock, and falls back to P x when the shock is
reversed.  The output prices determine the economy's position on its production possibility
frontier while the prices of capital goods, P Kx and PKm, together with the other parameters
determine the position of that frontier given that the sectoral capital stocks are endogenous to
the model rather than being fixed endowments.  We assume that the prices of the capital goods
are constant and in the simulations for simplicity we set them equal to each other, Px being
varied to change the initial conditions at the start of the shock.
Given (1) we have the following standard results for the return (ri) and cost (ci) of capital by
sector.  We include the term (1+s) though note that s is set to zero before and after the shock.
Given that labour is assumed fully mobile between the two sectors the wage rate, w, will
equalise so wx=wm and it is straightforward to show that:
It is convenient to derive results relative to the values that obtained before the shock (given by
superscript 0 corresponding to period 0 in the simulations) and we also want l x and lm separately





















































Having laid out the core components of the model we specify the pre-shock situation, the
response to the shock and the subsequent adjustment when shock reversal occurs.  For simplicity
we assume that the shock is not anticipated (while commenting later on the implications of
changing this assumption) and that the pre-shock value of P x has been in place long enough for
the sectoral capital stocks to adjust such that the return to capital is equal to its cost in each case.
The commodity price shock takes the form of P x changing to Px(1+s).  By assumption investment
involves a lag (of initially one period, the case we outline in the discussion) so the sectoral
capital stocks in the first period of reform are pre-determined.  By contrast labour is fully mobile
and hence an immediate labour reallocation towards the export sector will take place shown by
(5).  The shock implies an immediate reduction in the return to capital in the import competing
sector and the loss of labour exacerbates this.  The gain of labour in the export sector has the
opposite effect on the return to capital there.  In this first period investment decisions are taken
to determine the sectoral capital stocks in the following period.
If the shock were permanent the path of these capital stocks over time would be that M sector
capital would depreciate gradually down to its pre-shock value and X sector capital would
expand upwards to its new steady state, at each point earning a zero net return, the size of K x
being determined by this condition combined with the rate at which the M sector releases labour
as Km depreciates.
Turning to a temporary trade shock, defined by agents perceiving a probability of shock reversal
at each point, we anticipate increases in Kx, the key issue being by how much given the risk of
an excessively large capital stock in place after the end of the shock due to irreversibility.
Decreases in Km, following the reduction in its return to capital during the shock, will occur
gradually through depreciation until it reaches a steady state (assuming that reversal has not
already taken place).  K x will face a binding irreversibility constraint if reversal occurs and hence
the magnitude and probability of the losses that would result must be taken into account in
forward looking investment decisions while reform continues.  We adopt the simplifying
assumption that shock reversal (with the relative commodity price returning to its pre-reform
value) is, or at least is perceived to be, permanent.  If reversal does take place the roles of the
sectoral capital stocks are reversed in that Kx will depreciate gradually back to its pre-reform
level and Km will expand to its equivalent point, the expansion path being determined by a zero
profits condition on K m and the gradual reallocation of labour back to the M sector as K x
depreciates.  Hence the post-reversal outcome is relatively simple and it is this, combined with


















































More formally, at a given time, s, following reform but before any reversal and assuming that
the initial value of Kx is low enough for the irreversibility constraint not to bind, the desired and
actual capital stock in the X sector (assuming risk neutrality) will satisfy:
This is the standard equilibrium condition by which the expected present value of net returns to
a unit of capital invested at some time s (the decision to invest having been taken at t=s-1) is
equated to zero.
6  The terms rx(.) and cx give the return and cost of a unit of capital and hence
the term (1-￿x)
(t-s) appears because this gives the amount of an initial unit of capital left after s-t
periods.  It is helpful to separate out period s from (6) which gives:
This shows that the expected net return for period s (which depends on K x at that time) depends
on the expected net return in the periods that follow it in order that the expected net present
value as a whole is zero to reflect free entry at time s.  At this point the effect of the entry
asymmetry discussed earlier becomes important.  If reform continues at s, free entry means that
equilibrium condition (6) will be repeated and hence seen from the perspective of time s-1, the
expected present value of net returns if reform continues must be zero.  On the other hand if
reform is reversed, irreversibility implies that net returns will become negative for a number of
periods before depreciation reduces Kx to the point where net returns are zero once again.  This
asymmetry implies that a zero should be inserted within the summation of the second line of (7)
for future scenarios where reform continues.  Only future losses with reform reversal, together
with their associated probability, need appear.  Denoting T
s
x as the number of periods when
losses are made post reversal and making use of these arguments means that (7) may be
transformed to:
In (8), p is the perceived probability of reform reversal each period (which we take to be
constant) and the Kx term within the summation sign is given in relation to Kx at time s and the
number of periods of depreciation because net losses are being made during the interval s to s+T
s
x
and investment in the X sector will be zero.
Equilibrium condition (8) shows that investment will take place for time s to the point where the
capital stock gives an expected net return in that period equal to the present value of the losses
that would be incurred after that period if liberalisation is reversed at t=s, weighted by the
probability of that event.  As the capital stock expands for time s, the period s return will fall and
the size of future losses will rise because a higher Kx will be inherited at the time of reversal.








































































against expected losses if it is reversed which implies that the current period return will not be
driven to zero as would be the case if the liberalisation was fully credible.
Hence (8) confirms the intuitive idea that an expectation of reversal must weaken the investment
response to reform though it also highlights the fact that an improved current period return
following the shock will encourage commodity sector investment.  Given the assumption that
reversal entails a return to the pre-shock value of Px, (8) implies that the investment response in
the X sector must be positive because there is an increased current period return and the worst
outcome in the future is the same as before the shock.  As noted above, however, a positive
investment response in the X sector will not necessarily lead to a positive aggregate investment
response given that investment in the M sector will be zero during the transition after reform and
lower in the steady state than its initial value.  In turn a higher Kx and lower Km implies that real
income will increase with liberalisation whatever the perceived probability of reversal.
In order to facilitate numerical simulations we transform (8) by assuming Cobb Douglas
technology outlined above and also express Kx while reform continues relative to its credible
free trade value.
The system is completed by the labour allocation given by (5) and the value of K m which is
given by its depreciation path from its initial value until it reaches its post reform steady state
value, K
s s
m given by (10) which is derived straightforwardly from a zero expected net return
condition given the one period investment lag.
Which for Cobb-Douglas technology may be expressed by:
After reversal (5) continues to hold, Kx depreciates down to its initial pre-shock level and Km
increases to its pre-shock value, the pace of expansion being determined by a zero profits
condition combined with the depreciation path of Kx which affects the return to Km through the
release of labour.
The discussion and expressions above have assumed that the delivery or time to build lag before
new investment becomes productive is one year.  The extension to the four year lag for the
commodity sector (we assume that the lag for the M sector remains one year) is straightforward.
The structure of equations (6)-(9) remains the same but we replace (1-p), the probability of a
continued shock next period, with (1-p)
4 which is the probability of a continued shock in four8
periods time.  In turn this means that we replace p in the expressions with [1-(1-p)
4].  The longer
lag reduces the probability of a favourable shock state at the time that this period's investment
becomes productive and hence the investment response to the shock is much smaller.  This is
partly a reflection of the assumption that the K m lag remains unchanged (since a longer lag there
would slow down the post-reversal Km expansion which reduces the return to X sector capital
but even if this was allowed for the lower probability of a favourable post-lag P x would still
reduce the investment response.
Before simulating the model above we briefly note the implications of the trade shock being
anticipated.  Given that the shock increases the return to capital in the X sector and reduces it
in the M sector, a positive perceived probability of reform will tend to increase Kx and reduce
Km prior to reform.  In turn this implies a faster post-reform adjustment to the steady state but
will not affect the latter since it depends solely on the probability of reversal.
2. The Investment Response to a Trade Shock
This section reports the core results of the paper concerning the aggregate investment response
(based on the underlying sectoral responses) in response to a temporary trade shock.  Models of
the type set out above unfortunately do not readily generate tractable solutions and hence
simulation is necessary.  For this we use the parameter assumptions set out in the Appendix and
present the results in Figures 1-3 below.  The probability of shock reversal is set at 0.25 per
period while the shock continues and hence the initial expected duration of the shock is four
years.  Figure 1 shows the path of aggregate investment and the commodity price assuming that
shock reversal does take place after four years while Figures 2 and 3 assume two and six year
shock durations.  In each figure the left hand charts assume a one period lag in the X sector
while the right hand charts extend this to four years.  In addition the top pair of charts assume
that before the shock the X sector capital stock is relatively large compared with the initial M
sector capital stock, the middle pair of charts imposes symmetry between them while the lower
charts assume that the X sector is relatively small before the shock.  In addition the axes across
all three figures are standardised to facilitate visual comparisons.  It may also be noted that we
show investment expenditure taking place straightaway even though the new capital goods will
become productive only after the lag of one or four years.
We first consider Figure 1, which assumes a shock duration of four years, from which it may be
noted that the  aggregate investment series show spikes or jumps as well as more gradual
changes.  These reflect the absence of adjustment costs in the model which gives rise to rapid
capital adjustments if desired though more gradual changes are also present following the shock
and its reversal since after an initial adjustment the favoured sector (X during the shock, M after
its reversal) expands more slowly as the other sector's capital stock gradually depreciates.  If
adjustment costs were included the rapid adjustments would be smoothed but we may anticipate
that the overall profile of the series would not otherwise change.
It is clear from the charts, particularly Figure 1(c), the symmetric short lag case which is a
natural benchmark, that aggregate investment tends to respond to both the occurrence of the
shock and its reversal.  It may be recalled that after a change in relative prices the favoured
sector expands its capital stock relatively rapidly to take advantage of the new conditions
(though as argued above less so than if the shock were permanent) while the other sector stops
replacement investment in order to allow its capital stock to depreciate.  The net effect of these9
is shown to be positive in the first period of the shock since the upward adjustment in the
favoured sector is initially large but subsequently the lower investment in the non-favoured
sector dominates and aggregate investment is lower than before the shock or shock reversal.
This chain of events is present after a large upward or downward movement in the relative
commodity price since there is one favoured sector and one non-favoured sector in each case.
Hence a potential investment boom is predicted by the theory both at the start and the end of the
shocks modelled here.  In Figure 1(c) we impose symmetry on the initial sizes of the capital
stocks and there is an investment boom of comparable magnitude in periods 1 and 5 which
correspond to the start and end of the shock.
Figure 1(a) and 1(e) show that the relative size of the capital stocks is important in determining
the presence and relative size of these investment booms.  In Figure 1(a) the X sector is
relatively large and hence its expansion during the shock dominates the fall in M sector
investment while that capital stock depreciates, and in turn at the end of the shock the zero
investment in the X sector (to allow its capital stock to depreciate to its new post-shock steady
state) dominates the expansion of investment in the M sector such that there is no post-shock
investment boom.  In Figure 1(e) the relative sizes are reversed and the investment boom at the
start of the shock is smaller and that at the end of the boom much larger.
The right hand charts in Figure 1, which assume a four year investment lag, share this pattern
of the relative sizes of aggregate investment at the beginning and end of the shock but also show
very strongly that the initial aggregate investment response is at most zero and often negative.
This reflects the much smaller expansion in Kx due to the long lag such that the probability of
the shock continuing at the time that new capital becomes productive is greatly reduced.  This
factor does not alter the post-shock expansion of K m, both because we assume that its investment
lag remains at one year and also because the reversal of the shock is assumed to be permanent.
Figures 2 and 3 show how things change if the shock in fact lasts for two or six years
respectively.  A similar pattern of possible investment booms at the start and end of the shock
and the role of sector sizes is seen but in addition the post-shock investment boom is smaller for
the two year shocks and much larger for the six year shocks.  This results from the amount of
time the M sector capital stock has had to depreciate during the shock.  The steady state during
the shock (assuming that it continues) is reached only after five to seven years and up to that
time Km will continue to depreciate and hence investment in that sector will be larger at the end
of the shock the longer the shock duration.
Hence these simulations have broadly confirmed the prediction of the trade shocks literature of
an investment boom in response to a commodity price shock (and with it the likelihood of a
construction boom if non-tradeable capital "construction" goods are present) though they have
clarified a number of points.  First that similar investment booms may be anticipated at the end
of a shock and these may be larger than the initial boom depending on the relative size of the
two sectors and the duration of the shock.  Second that an investment boom at the start of the
shock is not certain (even in the absence of damping effects from adjustment costs) because the
increase in X sector investment may be dominated by the reduction in M sector investment (to
zero) at that time, particularly if a long delivery lag is present because that reduces the desired
expansion of the commodity sector.10
FIGURE 1: AGGREGATE INVESTMENT, 4 PERIOD SHOCK
LARGE INITIAL Kx/Km
a) 1 period X sector delivery lag b) 4 period X sector delivery lag
SYMMETRIC INITIAL Kx/Km
c) 1 period X sector delivery lag d) 4 period X sector delivery lag
SMALL INITIAL Kx/Km
e) 1 period X sector delivery lag f) 4 period X sector delivery lag11
FIGURE 2: AGGREGATE INVESTMENT, 2 PERIOD SHOCK
LARGE INITIAL Kx/Km
a) 1 period X sector delivery lag b) 4 period X sector delivery lag
SYMMETRIC INITIAL Kx/Km
c) 1 period X sector delivery lag d) 4 period X sector delivery lag
SMALL INITIAL Kx/Km
e) 1 period X sector delivery lag f) 4 period X sector delivery lag12
FIGURE 3: AGGREGATE INVESTMENT, 6 PERIOD SHOCK
LARGE INITIAL Kx/Km
a) 1 period X sector delivery lag b) 4 period X sector delivery lag
SYMMETRIC INITIAL Kx/Km
c) 1 period X sector delivery lag d) 4 period X sector delivery lag
SMALL INITIAL Kx/Km
e) 1 period X sector delivery lag f) 4 period X sector delivery lag13
In addition the simulations have highlighted possible reasons why the empirical investment
literature (see Serven, 1997) has found it difficult to establish a clear relationship between
investment and the terms of trade.  Such a relationship will exist in the underlying sense that
comparing steady states the terms of trade will determine the relative size of the two capital
stocks and their combined steady state (replacement) investment will change with that (albeit
in an ambiguous direction since relative depreciation rates will be important).  In the presence
of marked changes in commodity prices, however, investment data will tend to be dominated
by changes between steady states rather than the latter themselves.  The analysis above shows
very clearly that investment in the short run is likely to be a positive function of the absolute
change in the terms of trade rather than its level and if price changes are frequent and large such
short run effects are likely to predominate.  Furthermore the results also indicate that aggregate
investment may respond more or less, or not at all, to either upward or downward price
movements and the nature of such asymmetries may differ across countries since they depend
on relative sector sizes and investment lags.
We turn now to a brief examination of some empirical evidence for aggregate investment at the
time of the late 1970s coffee and cocoa shocks.  This evidence is intended to be indicative rather
than conclusive.  It was noted above that domestic price controls were in place in many countries
at that time and hence the emphasis on relative price changes in the theory above may be less
relevant for this period.  For this reason we show Collier and Gunning's (1999)
7 attribution of
these shocks as "private", "public" or "mixed" which are based on whether the change in world
prices largely fed through into domestic prices.
Figure 4 shows both aggregate investment and (where available) private investment for the
countries shown, each of which had a four year positive commodity price shock 1976-79,
8 and
hence the four year shock simulations of Figure 1 are the natural point of comparison with the
theoretical results.  Most striking about the charts of Figure 4 is how much more variable is
investment generally in the "private" pair of charts at the top, even though they are themselves
less jumpy than the theory results which is natural since the model above abstracted from
adjustment costs.  In addition the private shocks are consistent with the theory since they show
some of the "twin peaks" tendency of Figure 1.  The total investment/private investment split
is helpful here also since the time path of total investment in the top two charts is seen to be
driven largely by changes in private investment which is the concern of the theory work.  There
is some tendency for public investment (the gap between the two lines) to fall towards the end
of the period which is to be expected since a fall in export prices is likely to lead to falling
revenues.
The mixed shock cases of the middle charts show much less variation over time, aggregate and
private investment in Colombia showing some response after the end of the shock in 1979, while
aggregate investment in Senegal is unresponsive.  The public shock cases of the lower charts
show no response to the end of the shock and while private investment is not available for these
countries it is likely, given the public nature of the shock, that the aggregate picture is being
driven by public investment.14











3. Feedback Effects From the Investment Response to the World Commodity Price
The material above has been concerned with the investment response to a given, exogenous
commodity  price shock.   Given  the  information  that  it  has generated about  the possible
investment (and hence supply) dynamics during and after a shock a question arises as to what
that supply response, if repeated across a sufficient number of producers in a world market,
might imply on the reverse causation for the time path of the world price.  It should be
emphasised  that the empirical modelling  of commodity prices  has  proved  difficult and
controversial
9 and requires complexity that is well beyond the scope of this paper.  The literature
on commodity prices does not appear, however, to have  analysed the implications of the
irreversible investment response in commodity sectors to large price movements which is the
potential contribution of this paper.  In particular the nature of the investment response during
a shock determines in part the supply response which may affect the world price.  In addition,
and perhaps more importantly, the nature of irreversible capital is that after the end of a positive
price shock, the commodity sector capital stock (and hence to an extent supply, allowing for
much quicker movements of labour away from the commodity sector) will tend to fall slowly
constrained by depreciation and hence the post-shock level of supply will tend to be higher and
thus the world price lower, than before the shock, at least for a few periods until depreciation
has restored a steady state.
To illustrate these effects we suppose that the commodity price is determined by:
In this expression Px or Px(1+s) corresponds to the commodity price before/after and during
respectively the exogenous price shock analysed above but we now allow the actual P x that
obtains over time to depend also on the level of commodity output Q x as well as the price
elasticity of demand, ￿.  Hence the source of the price shock, s, remains exogenously imposed
but we now allow for a feedback effect from output to the world price while still abstracting
from all other sources of price movements.  We make the extremely strong assumption that all
producing countries are identical in their investment and supply responses, essentially to allow
a simple translation between the single country results above and world output which is what
influences the world price.  Clearly this is unrealistic but our purpose is to illustrate the possible
effects generated by the model, particularly in relation to the shape of the price path rather than
its exact level, and in that sense a simple exercise of this kind may still be informative.  Also for
illustrative purposes we assume that the commodity supply responses follow those of the model
which amounts to ignoring the further feedback effect from the different price path to different
supply responses.  The effect of a proper simultaneous determination of output and price may
however be seen in general terms from the simulations that follow.
Figures 5-7 below (which correspond to the same cases as Figures 1-3) give the results of taking
the earlier supply responses and using them to determine the endogenous price path.  In each
case the upper line is the simple exogenous price path used earlier while the lower line shows
how this changes if the output response alters the price by means of the equation above.  The gap
between the two lines therefore depends on the supply response of the commodity sector.  For
the simulations we use a price elasticity of demand of two.  Increasing this parameter reduces
the gap between the lines but our main interest as before is in the shape of the endogenous price16
path rather than its exact level and hence the general conclusions drawn are not sensitive to this
assumption.  Similarly if we allowed for the full simultaneous determination of output and price
the lower line would move towards the upper line (since the output response would be lower
given expectations that the world output response would lower the commodity price) but again
its general shape would not change greatly.
Considering Figure 5 it may be seen that a smaller initial Kx/Km gives rise to a bigger supply
response (a larger gap between the two lines).  This is because the commodity sector has a larger
pool of labour from the M sector to draw on (more formally the commodity sector can expand
employment without wages rising a steeply as if the M sector were smaller) which both increases
the immediate supply response due to labour reallocation while also raising the investment
response due to the beneficial cross effect on the return to capital of a greater labour movement.
Also the supply response and "endogenous" effect on price is smaller for the longer investment
lag cases since the commodity sector capital stock both rises less and after a longer delay.
These factors (together with the price elasticity of demand) determine the size of the feedback
effect from supply to price but perhaps of greater interest is that the S-shape endogenous price
path is broadly similar across the different cases (and in Figures 6-7 except that it is compressed
or shrunk according to the duration of the shock).  During the shock there is an immediate
supply response from labour reallocation and this is followed by an expansion of the commodity
sector capital stock (slowly in the 4 period lag cases) which further raises output such that the
initial price peak is not sustained.  Investment jumps up quickly and then gradually as the M
sector capital stock depreciates (shown most clearly in Figure 5(e)) so the supply response builds
up at a declining rate over time.  After the shock the irreversible nature of the commodity sector
capital stock means that its level (and hence in part the output of the commodity) falls only
gradually.  After the shock there is an immediate reallocation of labour back to the M sector but
X sector output nevertheless remains higher (and thus the endogenous price lower) for some time
until depreciation allows Kx to reach its steady state.
Once again it should be emphasised that commodity price determination is a difficult area and
its proper modelling requires consideration of numerous factors not included above, but to the
extent that other factors generate price shocks of the kind examined in the earlier section the
feedback effects shown here will exert some influence.  Of particular note, perhaps, is that the
irreversibility model predicts an overhang of low prices after the end of a positive shock.17
FIGURE 5: WORLD COMMODITY PRICE, 4 PERIOD SHOCK
LARGE INITIAL Kx/Km
a) 1 period X sector delivery lag b) 4 period X sector delivery lag
SYMMETRIC INITIAL Kx/Km
c) 1 period X sector delivery lag d) 4 period X sector delivery lag
SMALL INITIAL Kx/Km
e) 1 period X sector delivery lag f) 4 period X sector delivery lag18
FIGURE 6: WORLD COMMODITY PRICE, 2 PERIOD SHOCK
LARGE INITIAL Kx/Km
a) 1 period X sector delivery lag b) 4 period X sector delivery lag
SYMMETRIC INITIAL Kx/Km
c) 1 period X sector delivery lag d) 4 period X sector delivery lag
SMALL INITIAL Kx/Km
e) 1 period X sector delivery lag f) 4 period X sector delivery lag19
FIGURE 7: WORLD COMMODITY PRICE, 6 PERIOD SHOCK
LARGE INITIAL Kx/Km
a) 1 period X sector delivery lag b) 4 period X sector delivery lag
SYMMETRIC INITIAL Kx/Km
c) 1 period X sector delivery lag d) 4 period X sector delivery lag
SMALL INITIAL Kx/Km
e) 1 period X sector delivery lag f) 4 period X sector delivery lag20
4. Financing Constraints on the Investment Response
The final extension to the results presented is a brief consideration of the possible role of
financing constraints on the expansion of the commodity sector capital stock during the shock.
The formal analysis assumed a perfect world capital market and hence all investment needs
could readily be financed at a constant interest rate.  If we drop the unrealistic assumption of
access to such a market there are a number of possible modelling approaches, a key decision
being whether to assume a well functioning domestic capital  market (in which  national
consumption/saving responses to the shock are crucial) or alternatively that this market is also
highly imperfect in which case investment must be financed by internally generated funds.  We
show results for the latter case, since they follow more naturally from the scope of the paper, but
assume that the owners of capital can save on the world capital market at the interest rate used
above in which case the world interest rate becomes the opportunity cost of funds used for
investment.  This implies that the investment responses presented earlier are a ceiling on desired
investment given that interest rate and we compare the investment outcome with the financing
constraint with the earlier results.
In order to generate the financially constrained outcome we need to specify a counterfactual
consumption path for the owners of capital during the shock and we adopt the simplest form for
this in that it is assumed that consumption continues at the pre-shock level leaving any internally
generated funds above this level available for investment.  With respect to the latter we present
two cases, the first is where new capital must be financed solely from the return to capital itself
(relative to the consumption counterfactual for the return to capital only) and the second where
the return to both capital and the fixed factor (hence profits if they are both owned by the same
agents) is available, relative to the counterfactual consumption level for their combined return.
Figures 8-10 show the simulation outcomes for the unconstrained and constrained capital stocks
for these cases while for simplicity considering only symmetric initial sectoral capital stocks.
We also consider only the expansion of Kx during the shock since it is more difficult to specify
a consumption counterfactual for the subsequent expansion of the M sector capital stock after
shock reversal.
The consistent themes across the figures are that, i) financial constraints do not prevent some
investment response, a reflection of the correlation between times when current returns are high
and times when irreversible investment is desired, ii) returns from capital only impose a more
severe constraint than profits (which is to be expected given the windfall that accrues to the fixed
factor in the commodity sector during the shock), iii) that the X sector capital stock approaches
or reaches its unconstrained value if the shock persists for long enough, and iv) that the financing
constraints are much weaker for the longer investment lag cases.  The latter reflects the lower
unconstrained expansion combined with the absence of a quick capital stock response which
maintains the return to capital at a high level until the new capital goods become productive.21
FIGURE 8: FINANCING CONSTRAINTS ON INVESTMENT, 4 PERIOD SHOCK
(Symmetric initial Kx/Km)
X SECTOR INVESTMENT CONSTRAINED BY THE RETURN TO CAPITAL
a) 1 period X sector delivery lag b) 4 period X sector delivery lag
X SECTOR INVESTMENT CONSTRAINED BY PROFITS
c) 1 period X sector delivery lag d) 4 period X sector delivery lag22
FIGURE 9: FINANCING CONSTRAINTS ON INVESTMENT, 2 PERIOD SHOCK
(Symmetric initial Kx/Km)
X SECTOR INVESTMENT CONSTRAINED BY THE RETURN TO CAPITAL
a) 1 period X sector delivery lag b) 4 period X sector delivery lag
X SECTOR INVESTMENT CONSTRAINED BY PROFITS
c) 1 period X sector delivery lag d) 4 period X sector delivery lag23
FIGURE 10: FINANCING CONSTRAINTS ON INVESTMENT, 6 PERIOD SHOCK
(Symmetric initial Kx/Km)
X SECTOR INVESTMENT CONSTRAINED BY THE RETURN TO CAPITAL
a) 1 period X sector delivery lag b) 4 period X sector delivery lag
X SECTOR INVESTMENT CONSTRAINED BY PROFITS
c) 1 period X sector delivery lag d) 4 period X sector delivery lag24
5. Conclusion
The paper has analysed the irreversible sectoral and aggregate investment responses to a
temporary commodity price shock of uncertain duration.  A model was developed based on the
insights of the irreversibility and investment literature and used to generate predictions about the
likely occurrence and size of investment booms in response to shocks and their reversal.  The
predictions of the theory were shown to be broadly consistent with some empirical evidence
from the late 1970s coffee and cocoa shocks.  The implications of the analysis for the empirical
specification of investment-terms of trade equations were drawn out, together with possible
feedback effects onto world prices from the supply and investment response and an assessment
of the importance of imperfect capital markets in constraining that response.
APPENDIX
Parameter, notation and assumed values in simulations
Probability of shock reversal p 0.25
Proportionate shock size s 0.3
Km rate of depreciation ￿m 0.1
Kx rate of depreciation ￿x 0.1
World real interest rate r
* 5%
Share of labour in output (both sectors) ￿ 0.6
Share of capital in output (both sectors) ￿ 0.2
Share of permanently fixed factor (both sectors) 1-￿-￿ 0.2
Relative commodity price, Px Symmetric initial Kx/Km:P x set so initial lx=0.5
Large initial Kx/Km:P x set so initial lx=0.75
Small initial Kx/Km:P x set so initial lx=0.7525
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